It must be emphasized that, as the Mordechai [70] points out, a person who would strike his wife is not only in violation of the aforemen�tioned prohibitions, but he has committed additional prohibitions as well. The Talmud commands that a man show his wife "honor more than to himself." [71] Certainly, physical violence tramples this concept as well as many other relevant prohibitions. [72] Thus, such behavior is considered to be even more egregious and to be dealt with most severely. [73] R. Meir of Rothenberg [74] writes that the individual who would strike his wife must be excommunicated and punished with all means available to society. The Agudah [75] adds that the husband must give his sworn assurance that he will immediately cease this behavior and, if he does not, he must release his wife from the marriage and pay the full value of her ketubah. [76]

[70] Ketubot 5:186, quoting Rabbeinu Simchah. Note Responsa Terumat HaDeshen 218, and Sdei Chemed, Ma'arekhet Heih 5, at length.

[71] Yevamot 62b and Sanhedrin 76b.
[72] This is codified by the Rama in Even HaEzer 154:3.
[73] See Be'er HaGolah to Even HaEzer and Piskei Batei Din HaRabbaniyim 12, pp. 80-86, 91-92.
[74] Responsa Maharam MiRotenberg (Prague) 81.
[75] P. 121b.
[76] See also R. Eliezer Papo, Pele Yoetz, Ma'asekhet Haka'ah, and Pitchei Teshuvah, Even HaEzer 154:8.

And with this I retract what I wrote... that at weddings it is proper to seat single men and single women separately even if the married couples sit together. This is [still] so with young men and women who are not yet ready to get married. However, regarding those who have reached that stage, to the opposite, it is a mitzvah so that they get to know each other in a place where there is no concern for yihud and each couple is not alone on a "date," as is done today...

Essentially, migo is a sophisti�cated pleading in the alternative, in which a defendant states that since he has a legally provable defense that would allow him to triumph in court if he wished to disregard the ethical obligation of justice, that false defense, coupled with defendant?s sincere claim that he has a truthful defense (that he cannot prove) is sufficient in Jewish law to allow the defendant to triumph. (For example, if "A" borrowed $100 from "B" without any loan documentation and repaid the loan in the same way, then when "B" sues "A" for payment of the loan, "A" would claim that he already paid the loan. The court should believe him on that unprovable claim, because he has a very strong migo claim-that he never borrowed the money-which, if he were to assert, would allow him to prevail.)

It is important to realize (and this is commonly overlooked) that in order for a migo claim to be valid, the false claim must be one that the defendant would triumph with if the case and the false defense were actually litigated in court. If the migo claim can be defeated by the plaintiff through the presentation of evidence, then it is of no value. Jewish law essentially rewards the defendant for his honesty in labeling his provable defense as false, by allowing him to press it anyway. The common law tradition in that case simply encouraged perjury...